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ARE ARBITRATORS RIGHT EVEN WHEN THEY ARE WRONG?: 
SECOND CIRCUIT UPHOLDS ARBITRAL RULING ALLOWING IMPLICIT 
REFERENCE TO CLASS ARBITRATION 
 
Dustin Morgan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., the Second Circuit reversed a district court decision 
vacating an arbitral award that determined the arbitrator could properly rule on a class 
certification motion that would allow Jock (“Plaintiff”) and similarly situated plaintiffs to 
arbitrate discrimination claims against Sterling Jewelers (“Defendant”).1 The Second Circuit 
reasoned that the district court improperly applied the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) Section 
10(a)(4) grounds for vacatur; the district court ruled that the arbitrator improperly interpreted the 
law rather than undertaking the proper inquiry, which was whether the arbitrator had authority to 
rule under both the arbitral agreement and governing law.2 The court reasoned that the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. did not prohibit arbitrators from finding 
an implicit agreement allowing for class arbitration.3 The court stated that FAA section 10—
notably section 10(a)(4)—should be interpreted narrowly in order to promote the recourse to 
arbitration and the enforcement of arbitral awards.4 Challenges to arbitral awards brought under 
Section 10(a)(4) should only be upheld where the arbitrator “consider[s] issues beyond those the 
parties have submitted for her consideration, or reach[s] issues clearly prohibited by law or by the 
terms of the parties' agreement.”5 Reviewing courts should not engage in a review that asks 
whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the law or reached the right result.6 Finally, the court 
held that the Defendant’s interpretation of Stolt-Nielsen as requiring the explicit reference to class 
arbitration was unpersuasive.7 The court interpreted Stolt-Nielsen to prohibit class arbitration only 
where the parties have agreed that the arbitral agreement is silent on the class arbitration issue.8 
The dissent would have required a more express reference to class arbitration to allow the 
arbitrator to rule on class certification.9 This decision may settle the proper inquiry when 
considering motions for vacatur under FAA Section 10. But this clarity may come at the price of 
confusion regarding the ability of arbitrators to consider motions for class arbitration. 
                                                     
* Dustin Morgan is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2013 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir. 2011).  
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 121. 
4 Id. at 121–22. 
5 Id. at 122. 
6 Id. at 124.  
7 Id. at 125. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 129. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff filed a discrimination charge against her employer, Sterling Jewelers with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in May 2005.10 Plaintiff alleged that 
Sterling violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act by paying 
female employees less than their male counterparts.11 Eighteen other female plaintiffs also filed 
charges against Sterling with the EEOC.12 Jock and the other employees initiated the dispute 
resolution mechanism mandated by their employment contracts.13 The mechanism, referred to as 
RESOLVE, outlined a three-step resolution process.14 The process first allowed Sterling to make 
an initial determination after viewing the employee’s complaint.15 If the employee was 
dissatisfied with Sterling’s determination they could then refer their complaint to a mediator or 
panel of employees appointed by Sterling.16 Finally, employees could refer the dispute to 
arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).17 
Employment with Sterling was conditioned upon acceptance of the RESOLVE dispute resolution 
system.18 
In January 2008, the EEOC issued a letter outlining its findings; it found that Sterling had 
violated both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act through discriminatory compensation and 
promotion policies.19 After learning of the EEOC’s findings, Jock and the other Plaintiffs filed a 
class action lawsuit in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
alleging violations of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.20 Shortly after, Plaintiffs filed a demand 
for class arbitration with the AAA advancing similar claims.21 Plaintiffs then moved to stay the 
litigation in district court pending the outcome of arbitration.22 
In June 2008, the district court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion to stay litigation pending 
arbitration.23 The parties submitted to the arbitrator the question of whether the RESOLVE 
mechanism permitted resolution by class arbitration.24 The arbitrator issued an interim award 
finding that class arbitration was not prohibited by the RESOLVE mechanism and agreeing to 
hear a future class certification motion.25 In so ruling the arbitrator relied on the RESOVE 
mechanism’s language, which provided: 
                                                     
10 Id. at 115.  
11 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).  




16 Id. at 116. 
17 Id.; AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, 
available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/. 









I hereby utilize the Sterling RESOLVE program to pursue any dispute, 
claim, or controversy ("claim") against Sterling . . . regarding any 
alleged unlawful act regarding my employment or termination of my 
employment which could have otherwise been brought before an 
appropriate government or administrative agency or in a [sic] 
appropriate court, including but not limited to, claims under . . . Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Civil Rights Act of 1991, . . . 
the Fair Labor Standards Act. . . . I understand that by signing this 
Agreement I am waiving my right to obtain legal or equitable relief 
(e.g. monetary, injunctive or reinstatement) through any government 
agency or court, and I am also waiving my right to commence any 
court action. I may, however, seek and be awarded equal remedy 
through the RESOLVE program. The Arbitrator shall have the power to 
award any types of legal or equitable relief that would be available in a 
court of competent jurisdiction including, but not limited to, the costs 
of arbitration, attorney fees and punitive damages for causes of action 
when such damages are available under law.26 
The arbitrator, using Ohio law as mandated by the RESOLVE clause, determined that 
because Sterling had the ability to prevent recourse to class arbitration but failed to do so, the 
Plaintiffs must be allowed to pursue this procedural device.27 The arbitrator also allowed both 
parties to seek either confirmation or vacatur of this interim award.28  
In June 2009 Sterling moved to vacate the arbitrator’s interim award in district court.29 
The district court ruled that the arbitrator did not exceed her powers or rule in manifest disregard 
of the law, and in effect, confirmed the award.30 The court relied heavily on the Second Circuit’s 
determination in Stolt-Nielsen and declined to stay the action pending the Supreme Court’s 
resolution of the impending appeal.31 In January 2010 Sterling appealed the district court’s 
decision.32 Before the Second Circuit ruled on the appeal the Supreme Court rendered its decision 
in Stolt-Nielsen.33 Consequently, Sterling moved the district court to reconsider its original 
judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 62.1 and 60(b); the Second Circuit held 
the appeal in abeyance pending the decision by the district court on Sterling’s motion.34 
In July 2010 the district court issued an opinion stating that if jurisdiction were restored 
“it would reconsider its [previous] order and vacate the arbitrator's award that permitted the 
plaintiffs to pursue class certification.”35 The district court concluded that “in light of the 
                                                     
26 Id. at 116–17. 
27 Id. at 117; see also Montgomery v. Bd. of Educ., 131 N.E. 497, 498 (Ohio 1921) (“The law will not insert by 
construction for the benefit of one of the parties an exception or condition which the parties either by design or neglect 
have omitted from their own contract.”). 
28 Jock, 646 F.3d at 117. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 117–18; Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
31 Jock, 646 F.3d at 118; see also Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 99 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(finding that the arbitrators did not exceed their powers by allowing class arbitration where the arbitral clause was silent 
on the class arbitration issue). 
32 Jock, 646 F.3d at 118. 
33 Id.; see also Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (holding determination of 
whether class arbitration is appropriate is for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide and that there must be a clear intent 
to allow class arbitration in the arbitral clause for the procedural device to be appropriate). 
34 Jock, 646 F.3d at 118. 
35 Id. (citing Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
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Supreme Court’s decision in [Stolt-Nielsen] ‘the arbitrator's construction of the RESOLVE 
agreements as permitting class certification was in excess of her powers and therefore cannot be 
upheld.’”36 The district court ruled that its prior analysis, asking whether there was intent to 
preclude class arbitration, was inconsistent with Stolt-Nielsen and found that there was 
insufficient evidence in the arbitral clause necessary to find the requisite intent required to allow 
class arbitration.37 In August 2010, the Second Circuit restored jurisdiction in accordance with 
Sterling’s petition and the district court subsequently granted Sterling’s motion for vacatur of the 
arbitrator’s interim award.38 
III.  COURT’S ANALYSIS 
A. Effect of Stolt-Nielsen on the Implied References to Class Arbitration 
In considering the issue of whether the arbitrator properly allowed the Plaintiffs to submit 
a motion for class certification, in their arbitration against Sterling, the Second Circuit first 
examined the effects Stolt-Nielsen would have on the dispute.39 The court first recognized that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen allows courts to grant vacatur under FAA Section 10 
where the arbitrator refuses to rely on the arbitral agreement and instead makes a public policy 
determination.40 The court quickly limited this broad pronouncement by noting that the facts of 
Stolt-Nielsen were unique. Here, the parties conceded that the arbitral clause was silent on the 
class arbitration issue; because the arbitrator went beyond the language of the contract, the 
decision to allow class arbitration amounted to a policy decision beyond the language of the 
contract.41 
The Second Circuit viewed the silence in Stolt-Nielsen as a factor that distinguished that 
dispute from the present case.42 The stipulation in Stolt-Nielsen indicated that the parties were in 
complete agreement both about the inclusion of class arbitration within the contract and the intent 
to allow class arbitration.43 Despite this stipulation, the arbitrator allowed class arbitration and the 
Court was forced to articulate a rule that allows for recourse to class arbitration where “there is a 
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”44 The Court refused to hold that 
there must be an express contractual provision allowing for class arbitration, leaving open the 
possibility that the courts could find an implied agreement.45 This implicit agreement, however, 
                                                     
36 Jock, 646 F.3d at 118 (citing Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 119. 
40 Id.; see Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767-68; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 
1750 (2011).   
41 Jock, 646 F.3d at 119; see also Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768, 1774–75. 
42 Jock, 646 F.3d at 120. 
43 Id.; see also Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770, 1781. 
44 Jock, 646 F.3d at 121 (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775). 
45 Id. 
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may not be “infer[red] solely from the fact of the parties' agreement to arbitrate.”46 Silence on the 
issue of class arbitration alone cannot give rise to a finding of an implied agreement.47 
B. Authority to Vacate Under FAA Section 10 
The Second Circuit recognized that the four grounds for vacatur articulated in FAA 
Section 10, as well as the common law ground of manifest disregard, must be interpreted 
narrowly so as to promote the enforcement of arbitral awards.48 This narrow interpretation 
requires that courts only vacate awards where one of the enumerated grounds is “affirmatively 
shown to exist.”49 Accordingly, Section 10(a)(4) has been interpreted narrowly so as to allow 
vacatur only where the arbitrator has ruled on a question not submitted or reached a conclusion on 
an issue prohibited either by the arbitral clause or law.50 The inquiry under Section 10(a)(4) is 
limited to whether the arbitrator had the power to rule on a particular issue, not whether the 
arbitrator made the correct determination; review for legal error is impermissible.51 Emphasizing 
the high hurdle required of a movant in order to prevail under 10(a)(4), the Court in Stolt-Nielsen 
articulated the circumstances in which an arbitrator “exceeds his powers”:  
It is not enough . . . to show that the panel committed an error—or even 
a serious error. It is only when an arbitrator strays from interpretation 
and application of the agreement and effectively dispenses his own 
brand of industrial justice that his decision may be unenforceable.52 
It is from this narrow standard that the Second Circuit was tasked with determining 
whether the district court’s decision to vacate the arbitrator’s interim award was proper. 
The Second Circuit reasoned that the district court’s inquiry should have been limited to 
whether “the parties had submitted to the arbitrator the question of whether their arbitration 
agreement permitted class arbitration and . . . whether the agreement or the law categorically 
prohibited the arbitrator from reaching that issue.”53 Instead of engaging in this narrow inquiry, 
the district court focused on whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the arbitral agreement.54  
                                                     
46 Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775). 
47Id.; Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776 (“[T]he differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too 
great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties’ mere silence on 
the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.”). Several other 
cases have adopted or expanded on the nature of class arbitration. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740, 1750-51 (2011) (finding the change from bilateral to class arbitration is a fundamental one that drastically 
changes the underlying nature of the dispute). 
48 Jock, 646 F.3d at 121. 
49 Id. (citing Wall Street Assocs., L.P. v. Becker Paribas Inc., 27 F.3d 845, 849 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
50 Id.; see also ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. of New York v. EMC Nat'l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor  Co., 304 F.3d 200, 220 (2d Cir. 2002); accord Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv 
West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that arbitral awards may be vacated under the manifest 
disregard standard); but see Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[M]anifest 
disregard of the law is no longer an independent ground for vacating arbitration awards under the FAA.”). 
51 Jock, 646 F.3d at 122; see also Westerbeke, 304 F.3d at 220 (“Section 10(a)(4) does not permit vacatur for 
legal errors.”). 
52 Jock, 646 F.3d at 122 (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
53 Id. at 123. 
54 Id. 
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Applying this standard, the Second Circuit found the lower court to err based on a subtle 
distinction between facts found in the case at hand with the facts in Stolt-Nielson. Here, the 
Plaintiffs’ conceded that there was no explicit reference to class arbitration in the arbitral clause. 
But even if there is no explicit agreement, such a finding does not necessarily confer the same 
“silent” status bestowed upon the agreement examined in Stolt-Nielson.55 To the contrary, the 
question of whether the agreement implicitly permitted class arbitration was still squarely in 
dispute and was thus properly before the arbitrator.56 And with the issue not rendered moot by the 
Plaintiffs’ concession, the arbitrator could not exceed her authority under the arbitration 
agreement by entertaining the question of whether class proceedings would be proper.57 This 
finding, coupled with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the holding in Stolt-Nielsen—that 
there is no bright-line rule that would prevent finding an implicit agreement to undergo class 
arbitration—formed the basis as to why the district court erred in vacating the award under 
Section 10(a)(4).58 
C. Dismissal of Sterling’s Interpretation of Stolt-Nielsen 
In distinguishing the district court’s determination from Stolt-Nielsen, the Second Circuit 
relied on a narrow reading of the term “silence” within the opinion.59 Sterling argued that because 
the arbitrator found that the arbitral agreement merely did not prohibit class arbitration, rather 
than making the express finding that the agreement allowed arbitration, the arbitrator exceeded 
her authority.60 The court dismissed this argument because it assumed a legal standard that had 
not been introduced at the time of the decision; Stolt-Nielsen had yet to be decided, and in the 
court’s opinion, the district court also incorrectly interpreted the case law.61 Stolt-Nielsen does not 
require that the intent to allow class arbitration be expressly stated; the decision merely limits that 
arbitrator’s authority to rely on public policy and go beyond the agreement when making a 
determination.62 Since the arbitrator relied on the agreement in allowing class arbitration, the 
reliance on Stolt-Nielsen to support vacatur was unfounded.63 
In support of its determination, the Second Circuit affirmed that under Stolt-Nielsen the 
FAA defines federal arbitration law64, but it refused to hold that state law is irrelevant in making 
determinations about the parties’ intent.65 The court stated that “a primary concern for the Court 
in Stolt-Nielsen was that the arbitration panel based its holding on public policy grounds, rather 
than looking to the FAA, maritime, or state law.”66 Stolt-Nielsen implicitly allows for reliance on 
state law where the parties intent regarding class arbitration cannot be readily determined.67 
                                                     
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 124. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 125.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 125–26; see also Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776 n.10. 
63 Jock, 646 F.3d at 126. 
64 See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (arguing that the FAA 
creates federal substantive arbitration law). 
65 Jock, 646 F.3d at 126. 
66 Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768–69). 
67 Id. 
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Therefore, the arbitrator’s reliance on Ohio law in determining that the RESOLVE program 
allows class arbitration does not stand in opposition to Supreme Court precedent.68 
D. Dissent’s Interpretation of Stolt-Nielsen 
The dissent in Jock read Stolt-Nielsen as creating a bright-line test for determining 
whether an arbitrator can impose class arbitration on contracting parties; the arbitrator can impose 
class arbitration only where the arbitral clause expressly allows for this procedural measure.69 
The dissent refused to distinguish Stolt-Nielsen and rejected the arguments presented by the 
majority opinion for doing so.70 The dissent expressly rejected the idea that Stolt-Nielsen supports 
the finding of implied agreements to arbitrate on a class-wide basis and argued that the FAA, not 
state law, presents the uniform national law governing the interpretation of arbitral agreements.71 
The dissent would create a bright-line rule whereby parties would have to explicitly state that 
class arbitration is allowed for recourse to the procedural device to be appropriate.72 
IV.  SIGNIFICANCE 
Jock v. Sterling highlights a struggle between important ideals within the arbitration 
system. The Second Circuit was faced with a choice between confirming an arbitral award and 
enforcing an arbitral contract as written. The Supreme Court has stressed the ideals of freedom of 
contract and the enforcement of arbitral awards over the past half-century.73 By overturning the 
district court’s decision to vacate the arbitrator’s interim award, the Second Circuit implicitly 
reiterated the ideal that enforcement of arbitral awards still serve as vital to maintaining the 
viability of arbitration. Jock’s ruling can thus serve as clear guidance for district courts struggling 
to understand the extent to which a court is to defer to an arbitrator’s decision.  
But while Jock may promote uniformity and efficiency within the judicial confirmation 
process, it may come at the cost of clarity regarding the more precise capability of arbitrators to 
mandate class arbitration. Both AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen seem to 
clearly establish the Supreme Court’s opinion about class arbitration: the procedure 
fundamentally alters the nature of the arbitral adjudication and thus may be proper only when 
found as consistent with the contracting parties’ intent when originally agreeing to submit 
disputes to “arbitration.”74 The Supreme Court’s views on the matter thus seem incompatible with 
the Second Circuit’s ruling in Jock, which may very well be read as an attempt to rationalize how 
the arbitrator could have found class proceedings consistent with the parties’ intent as embodied 
in their arbitral clause. Stolt-Nielson’s holding is now cloudier in the Second Circuit, as district 
                                                     
68 Id. at 127. 
69 Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (Winter, C.J., dissenting).  
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 130–31. 
72 Id. at 132–33. 
73 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (arguing arbitration is a matter of consent and 
agreements to arbitrate can be freely structured by parties); Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 
(2010) (finding freedom of contract principles require parties to be clear in their intent to allow class arbitration); Volt 
Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (ruling that freedom of contract principles dictate that parties should be 
allowed to structure arbitral agreements as they see fit). 
74 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-52; Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775–76. 
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courts are left to consider the effect of any distinguishable fact when deciding upon a motion to 
vacate the arbitrators interim award that calls for class proceedings.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has been relatively consistent within its series of arbitration 
decisions. The Court has articulated a doctrine that is friendly to arbitration, and cases have 
articulated bright-line rules that favor the recourse to arbitration, freedom to decide method of 
dispute resolution, and confirmation of awards. In recent years the Court has also articulated a 
doctrine that has been hostile to class action and class arbitration.75 In both AT&T Mobility and 
Stolt-Nielsen the Court seemed to be resoundingly clear; the decision of whether class arbitration 
is proper is left to the court, this mechanism changes the arbitral process, and class arbitration is 
proper only where the intent to resort to this procedural mechanism can be clearly established 
from the arbitral clause.76 Whether these decisions were rightly decided or not is still a matter of 
debate, but these decisions did seem to provide a level of clarity to a highly contentious area of 
arbitration law in the United States.  
The Second Circuit in Jock may have done irreparable harm to this clarity. The court, by 
allowing intent to resort to class arbitration to be implicitly determined, may have opened up new 
questions within a seemingly settled area of arbitration law. Courts within the jurisdiction will 
now have to determine what type of language constitutes an implicit reference to class arbitration, 
how far the parties must go before the procedural mechanism will be allowed, and whether the 
courts or arbitrator will have the final word regarding whether class arbitration is appropriate in 
an individual matter. These questions can only be answered in a case-by-case manner, costing 
both the court system and individual litigants money. While the Second Circuit may justify this 
decision by citing a preference to the confirmation of arbitral awards, this doctrine was justified 
to promote cost-effectiveness and efficiency that the court may have eroded by implicitly 
overturning Supreme Court precedents that provided clarity to a complicated and highly-
contentious issue. 
                                                     
75 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).  
76 See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–52; Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775–76. 
